Introduction
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Airborne Corps (中国人民解放军空降兵军) received its new name in April 2017, and delegations from the Corps performed well at the Airborne Platoon event in the International Army Games in 2017 and 2018. In 2018, Chinese paratroops (and heavy equipment) made their inaugural jump from the country’s first indigenously-built aircraft in its strategic airlift fleet, the Y-20. Seven years on, and with the specter of a potential future conflict over Taiwan ever more present in international press, government and think tank circles, how might the Airborne Corps perform if it participated in a Joint Island Landing Campaign (JILC)? If you are fairly new to researching the PLA like us, this article aims to equip you with some must-reads for ongoing research, and our view.
New capabilities and training
This article by ANI News is a useful and readable primer on the Airborne Corps. It draws on PLA doctrine contained in the China’s “Science of Campaigns” document, which is a core text in Chinese military officer education, according to the China Aerospace Studies Institute. Operational uses for PLA Airborne forces include sabotage behind enemy lines to assist the PLA getting full command of the air, complementing any amphibious landing operations by seizing key facilities, disrupting enemy defenses and acting as a blocking force to hold up enemy counterattacks.
China has been working hard to bolster its strategic airlift capabilities (we’d recommend reading Christina Garafola‘s paper in the China Maritime Report No 19 for more details). Furthermore, like their Russian and Soviet Airborne counterparts before them, Chinese Airborne forces have built in concepts around airdropped IFVs such as the ZBD-03, as well as Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) equipment like the Hongjian to boost their anti-armor profile. If you are a Mandarin speaker and are looking for in-country images , you can see videos of Airborne Corps in training from China’s state-backed CCTV channel here . From 2:05, you will see imagery of PLAAF Airborne Corps troopers training with IFVs, multiple rocket systems and other equipment.
The PLA Airborne Corps has also been conducting numerous training exercises, including ones that appear to rehearse Taiwan contingency operations. This Jamestown Foundation paper by Daniel Fu goes into more detail on these exercises and potential deployments of Airborne Corps forces.
The peace disease and the Russian precedent
From our reading, it is clear that the PLAAF Airborne Corps’ has made great strides to bolster its equipment, training and strategic airlift capabilities. That being said, various sources point to the lack of combat experience. Xi Jinping himself has called for treating or removing the “peace disease” (和平病). The aforementioned ANI notes that the ambitious operational uses outlined in Science of Campaigns may be difficult to achieve, especially in light of the performance of Russian VDV Airborne Forces (who have prior combat experience) at Hostomel in the Ukraine war. In fact, we’ve noticed a number of Chinese social media posts on Sohu and 163 trying to understand how on earth this ‘Airborne Disaster’ happened. Large-scale deployments of the PLAAF Airborne Corps in a JILC scenario would risk using up valuable air assets, rely on continuous resupply until relieved, and deprive the CPC from having a mobile reserve on the mainland (PLA Airborne Forces have been deployed internally to deal with disaster relief for instance.)
The PLA is no doubt looking at historical deployments of airborne forces. On this point, any military historian worth their salt would point to both victories that shook the opposition such as the operation to take the Belgian fort of Eben Emael by glider-borne German Fallschirmjager troops in 1940 or the larger scale landings by the British 6th Airborne Division in Normandy (Operation Tonga), but equally pyrrhic victories for German airborne forces in the Battle of Crete (Operation Mercury) or operational failures likes Operation Market Garden, which calibrated thinking in German and Allied High Commands respectively about large-scale Airborne operations for the rest of the war. Helicopter-borne air assault missions in the Vietnam War or other US airdrops in interventions in Latin America will surely also figure in PLA thinking.
When thinking about deploying the Airborne Corps in a JILC context, PLA commanders must understand that not only are such operations highly risky and potentially costly in terms of lives and airframes, but also that if the amphibious landings failed to bring the required relief and reinforcement on time, then any deployed Airborne Forces would- like at Hostomel- be isolated and wiped out or captured.